Wesley Collected Works Vol 9
| Author | John Wesley |
|---|---|
| Type | treatise |
| Year | None |
| Passage ID | jw-wesley-collected-works-vol-9-409 |
| Words | 397 |
And this is true
holiness of heart. You answer, (in many words,) “The new-created man did
not love God supremely. For, before he could love God, the
powers of his mind must have been quite finished, and actually
exercised.” (Page 186.) And, doubtless, the very moment he
was created, they were quite finished, and actually exercised
too. For man was not gradually formed by God, as a statue is
by a human artificer; but “He spake the word, and they were
made; He commanded, and they were created.” And as light
and heat were not subsequent to the creation of the sun, but
began to exist with it, so that the moment it existed it shone;
so spiritual light and heat, knowledge and love, were not sub
sequent to the creation of man, but they began to exist toge
ther with him. The moment he existed, he knew and loved. 2. If the new-made creature had not a propensity to love
and obey God, but was in a state of mere indifference to good
or evil, then his being put into such an union with flesh and
blood, among a thousand temptations, would have been an
over-balance on the side of vice. But our reason can never
suppose, that God, the wise, just, and good, would have placed
a new-made creature in such a situation. This argument cannot be answered, unless it can be showed,
either, (1.) That in such a situation, there would not have
been an over-balance on the side of vice; or, (2.) That to
place a new-made creature in a situation where there was such
an over-balance, was consistent with the wisdom, justice, and
goodness of God. But, instead of showing, or even attempting to show, this,
you feebly say, “I do not think the reason of man by any
means sufficient to direct God, in what state to make moral
agents.” (O that you had always thought so ! How much
vain, yea, mischievous, reasoning had then been spared!)
“But, however Adam’s propensities and temptations were
balanced, he had freedom to choose evil as well as good.”
(Pages 187, 188.) He had. But this is no answer to the
argument, which, like the former, remains in its full force. How could a wise, just, and good God place his creature in
such a state as that the scale of evil should preponderate?