Wesley Collected Works Vol 9
| Author | John Wesley |
|---|---|
| Type | treatise |
| Year | None |
| Passage ID | jw-wesley-collected-works-vol-9-400 |
| Words | 394 |
It is his work, and his will, (for he works nothing but what he
wills,) and yet the sinfulness of the action is neither his work
nor will. “But can those passions or propensities be sinful, which are
neither caused nor consented to by me?” I answer, Spite,
envy, and those other passions and tempers which are mani
festly discernible even in little children, are certainly not
virtuous, not morally good, whether you term them sinful or
not; and it is as certain, these exist before they are consented
to, much less caused by, those that feel them. “But sin, if
it is unavoidable, is no sin.” (Page 143.) Whether you term
it sin or not, it is contrary to the nature of God, and a trans
gression of his holy and good law. “But a natural moral evil is a contradiction; for if it be
natural, it cannot be moral.” That tempers contrary to the
nature and the law of God are natural, is a point of daily
experience; but if you do not choose to call these morally
evil, call them what you please. All I aver is, that such
tempers do exist in us antecedent to our choice. “But if the actual sins of men proceed from a corrupt
nature, they are unavoidable, and consequently no sins at all.”
(Page 144.) Actual sins may proceed from a corrupt nature,
and yet not be unavoidable; but if actions contrary to the
nature of God were unavoidable, it would not follow that they
were innocent. To the question, “How comes it to pass, that our passions
and appetites are now so irregular and strong, that not one
person has resisted them so far as to keep himself pure and
innocent?” you answer by another question, “How came Adam
not to keep himself pure and innocent?” (Page 145.) There
is no parity between the one case and the other. I can account
for any one man’s committing sin, supposing him to be natu
rally upright, as easily as for Adam’s committing it. Any one
person, as well as Adam, though naturally inclined to neither,
might choose either good or evil; and, on this supposition, he
would be as likely to choose one as the other. But the case
is extremely different, if you place Adam on one side, and all
mankind on the other.