Wesley Corpus

For it may be where there is no religion at all; in men of the most abandoned lives; yea, in the devil himself. And yet this does not prove that I “separate reason from grace; ” that I “discard reason from the service of religion.” I do continually “employ it to distinguish between right and wrong opinions.” I never affirmed “this distinction to be of little consequence,” or denied “the gospel to be a reasonable service.” (Page 158.) But “the Apostle Paul considered right opinions as a full third part, at least, of religion. For he says, “The fruit of the Spirit is in all goodness, and righteousness, and truth. By goodness is meant the conduct of particulars to the whole, and consists in habits of social virtue; and this refers to Christian practice. By righteousness is meant the conduct of the whole to particulars, and consists in the gentle use of BiSHOP OF GLOUCESTER. 127 church authority; and this refers to Christian discipline. By truth is meant the conduct of the whole, and of particulars to one another, and consists in orthodoxy or right opinion; and this refers to Christian doctrine.” (Page 159.) My objections to this account are, First, It contradicts St. Paul; Secondly, It contradicts itself. First. It contradicts St. Paul. It fixes a meaning upon his words, foreign both to the text and context. The plain sense of the text, taken in connexion with the context, is no other than this: (Eph. v. 9:) “The fruit of the Spirit” (rather, “of the light,” which Bengelius proves to be the true reading, opposite to “the unfruitful works of darkness,” mentioned verse 11) “is,” consists, “in all goodness, kind ness, tender-heartedness,” (iv. 32,)--opposite to “bitterness, wrath, anger, clamour, evil-speaking; ” (verse 31;) “in all righteousness,” rendering unto all their dues,--opposite to “stealing; ” (verse 28;) “ and in all truth,” veracity, sin cerity,-opposite to “lying.” (Verse 25.) Secondly. That interpretation contradicts itself; and that in every article. For, 1. If by “goodness” be meant “the conduct of particulars to the whole,” then it does not consist in habits of social virtue. For social virtue regulates the conduct of particulars, not so properly to the whole as to each other. 2.