Wesley Collected Works Vol 8
| Author | John Wesley |
|---|---|
| Type | treatise |
| Year | None |
| Passage ID | jw-wesley-collected-works-vol-8-014 |
| Words | 379 |
And
seeing our ideas are not innate, but must all originally come
from our senses, it is certainly necessary that you have senses
capable of discerning objects of this kind: Not those only
which are called natural senses, which in this respect profit
nothing, as being altogether incapable of discerning objects of
a spiritual kind; but spiritual senses, exercised to discern
spiritual good and evil. It is necessary that you have the hear
ting ear, and the seeing eye, emphatically so called; that you
have a new class of senses opened in your soul, not depending
on organs of flesh and blood, to be “the evidence of things not
seen,” as your bodily senses are of visible things; to be the
avenues to the invisible world, to discern spiritual objects,
and to furnish you with ideas of what the outward “eye hath
not seen, neither the ear heard.”
33. And till you have these internal senses, till the eyes of
your understanding are opened, you can have no apprehension
of divine things, no idea of them at all. Nor, consequently,
till then, can you either judge truly, or reason justly, concern
ing them; seeing your reason has no ground whereon to
stand, no materials to work upon. 34. To use the trite instance: As you cannot reason con
cerning colours, if you have no natural sight, because all the
ideas received by your other senses are of a different kind; so
that neither your hearing, nor any other sense, can supply your
want of sight, or furnish your reason in this respect with matter
to work upon: Soyou cannot reason concerning spiritual things,
if you have no spiritual sight; because all your ideas received
by your outward senses are of a different kind; yea, far more
different from those received by faith or internal sensation, than
the idea of colour from that of sound. These are only different
species of one genus, namely, sensible ideas, received by exter
nal sensation; whereas the ideas of faith differ toto genere from
those of external sensation. So that it is not conceivable, that
external sensation should supply the want of internal senses; or
furnish your reason in this respect with matter to work upon. 35. What then will your reason do here?