Wesley Corpus

Only with this difference, (which was necessary for completing the design of the great Artificer,) that he seems to himself perfectly free; he imagines that he is unnecessitated, and master of his own motion; whereas in truth he no more directs or moves himself, than any other wheel in the machine. The general inference then is still the same; the point which all these so laboriously endeavour to prove is, that inevitable necessity governs all things, and men have no more liberty than stones. V. 1. But allowing all this; allowing (in a sense) all that Dr. Hartley, Edwards, and their associates contend for; what discovery have they made? What new thing have they found out? What does all this amount to? With infinite pains, with immense parade, with the utmost ostentation of mathematical and metaphysical learning, they have discovered just as much as they might have found in one single line of the Bible. “Without me ye can do nothing !” absolutely, positively nothing ! seeing, in Him all things live and move, as well as have their being; seeing, he is not only the true primum mobile, containing the whole frame of creation, but likewise the inward, sustaining, acting principle, indeed the only proper agent in the universe; unless so far as he imparts a spark of his active, self-moving nature to created spirits. But more especially “ye can do nothing” right, nothing wise, nothing good, without the direct, immediate agency of the First Cause. 2. Let the trial be made. And First, what can reason, all-sufficient reason, do in this matter? Let us try, upon Dr. Hartley’s scheme. Can it prevent or alter the vibrations of the brain? Can it prevent or alter the various compo sitions of them ? or cut off the cqnnexion between these, and our apprehensions, judgments, reasonings? or between these and our passions? or that between our passions, and our words and actions? Not at all. Reason can do nothing in this matter. In spite of all our reason, nature will keep its course, will hold on its way, and utterly bear down its feeble opponent. 3. And what can reason do, upon the second supposition? Can it prevent or alter the traces in the brain? Not a jot more than it could the vibrations. They laugh at all its power.