Wesley Collected Works Vol 10
| Author | John Wesley |
|---|---|
| Type | treatise |
| Year | None |
| Passage ID | jw-wesley-collected-works-vol-10-537 |
| Words | 385 |
Let us now weigh the main argument on which this author
builds the melancholy hypothesis of necessity: “Actions neces
sarily arise from their several motives: Therefore, all human
actions are necessary.” Again: “In all cases the choice must
be determined by that motive which appears the best upon the
whole. But motives are not under our power. Man is passive
in receiving impressions of things, according to which the last
judgment is necessarily formed. This the will necessarily
obeys, and the outward action necessarily follows the will.”
Let us take this boasted argument in pieces, and survey it
part by part. (1) “Motives are not under our power.” This
is not universally true: Some are, some are not. That man
has a strong motive to run his neighbour through, namely,
violent anger; and yet the action does not necessarily follow. Often it does not follow at all; and where it does, not neces
sarily: He might have resisted that motive. (2) “In all
cases the choice must be determined by that motive which
appears the best upon the whole.” This is absolutely false. It is flatly contrary to the experience of all mankind. Who
may not say on many occasions, Video meliora 2* I know
what I do, is not “best upon the whole?” (3.) “Man is
passive in receiving the impressions of things.” Not
altogether. Even here much depends on his own choice. In many cases he may or may not receive the impression; in
most he may vary it greatly. (4.) “According to these his
last judgment is necessarily formed.” Nay, this too depends
much upon his choice. Sometimes his first, sometimes his
last, judgment, is according to the impressions which he has
received; and frequently it is not. (5.) “This the will
necessarily obeys.” Indeed it does not. The mind has an
intrinsic power of cutting off the connexion between the
judgment and the will. (6) “And the outward action
necessarily follows the will.” Not so. The thing I would, I
do not; and the thing I would not, that I do. Whatever
then becomes of the chain of events, this chain of argument
has not one good link belonging to it. * This quotation from Ovid is thus translated by Tate :
“I see my error, yet to ruin move.”-ED1T. 4.