Wesley Collected Works Vol 10
| Author | John Wesley |
|---|---|
| Type | treatise |
| Year | None |
| Passage ID | jw-wesley-collected-works-vol-10-526 |
| Words | 389 |
It is not easy for a man of common understanding,
especially if unassisted by education, to unravel these finely
woven schemes, or show distinctly where the fallacy lies. But he knows, he feels, he is certain, they cannot be true;
that the holy God cannot be the author of sin. The horrid
consequences of supposing this may appear to the meanest
understanding, from a few plain, obvious considerations, of
which every man that has common sense may judge. If all the passions, the tempers, the actions of men, are
wholly independent on their own choice, are governed by a
principle exterior to themselves, then there can be no moral
good or evil; there can be neither virtue nor vice, neither
good nor bad actions, neither good nor bad passions or tempers. The sun does much good; but it is no virtue; but he is not
capable of moral goodness. Why is he not? For this plain
reason, because he does not act from choice. The sea does
much harm: It swallows up thousands of men; but it is not
capable of moral badness, because it does not act by choice,
but from a necessity of mature. If indeed one or the other
can be said to act at all. Properly speaking, it does not : It
is purely passive: It is only acted upon by the Creator; and
must move in this manner and no other, seeing it cannot
resist His will. In like manner, St. Paul did much good:
But it was no virtue, if he did not act from choice. And if he
was in all things necessitated to think and act, he was not
capable of moral goodness. Nero does much evil; murders
thousands of men, and sets fire to the city: But it is no fault;
he is not capable of moral badness, if he does not act from
choice, but necessity. Nay, properly, the man does not act at
all : He is only acted upon by the Creator, and must move thus,
being irresistibly impelled. For who can resist his will? 2. Again: If all the actions, and passions, and tempers of
men are quite independent on their own choice, are governed
by a principle exterior to themselves; then none of them is
either rewardable or punishable, is either praise or blame
worthy.