Wesley Corpus

Wesley Collected Works Vol 10

AuthorJohn Wesley
Typetreatise
YearNone
Passage IDjw-wesley-collected-works-vol-10-526
Words389
Free Will Catholic Spirit Universal Redemption
It is not easy for a man of common understanding, especially if unassisted by education, to unravel these finely woven schemes, or show distinctly where the fallacy lies. But he knows, he feels, he is certain, they cannot be true; that the holy God cannot be the author of sin. The horrid consequences of supposing this may appear to the meanest understanding, from a few plain, obvious considerations, of which every man that has common sense may judge. If all the passions, the tempers, the actions of men, are wholly independent on their own choice, are governed by a principle exterior to themselves, then there can be no moral good or evil; there can be neither virtue nor vice, neither good nor bad actions, neither good nor bad passions or tempers. The sun does much good; but it is no virtue; but he is not capable of moral goodness. Why is he not? For this plain reason, because he does not act from choice. The sea does much harm: It swallows up thousands of men; but it is not capable of moral badness, because it does not act by choice, but from a necessity of mature. If indeed one or the other can be said to act at all. Properly speaking, it does not : It is purely passive: It is only acted upon by the Creator; and must move in this manner and no other, seeing it cannot resist His will. In like manner, St. Paul did much good: But it was no virtue, if he did not act from choice. And if he was in all things necessitated to think and act, he was not capable of moral goodness. Nero does much evil; murders thousands of men, and sets fire to the city: But it is no fault; he is not capable of moral badness, if he does not act from choice, but necessity. Nay, properly, the man does not act at all : He is only acted upon by the Creator, and must move thus, being irresistibly impelled. For who can resist his will? 2. Again: If all the actions, and passions, and tempers of men are quite independent on their own choice, are governed by a principle exterior to themselves; then none of them is either rewardable or punishable, is either praise or blame worthy.