Wesley Corpus

But Mr. Edwards has found out a most ingenious way of evading this consequence: “I grant,” says that good and sensible man, “if the actions of men were involuntary, the consequence would inevitably follow,-they could not be either good or evil; nor, therefore, could they be the proper object either of reward or punish ment. But here lies the very ground of your mistake; their actions are not involuntary. The actions of men are quite voluntary; the fruit of their own will. They love, they desire, evil things; therefore they commit them. But love and hate, desire and aversion, are only several modes of willing. Now, if men voluntarily commit theft, adultery, or murder, certainly the actions are evil, and therefore punish able. And if they voluntarily serve God, and help their neighbours, the actions are good, and therefore rewardable.” 7. I cannot possibly allow the consequence, upon Mr. Edwards's supposition. Still I say, if they are necessitated to commit robbery or murder, they are not punishable for commit ting it. But you answer, “Nay, their actions are voluntary, the fruit of their own will.” If they are, yet that is not enough to make them either good or evil. For their will, on your sup position, is irresistibly impelled; so that they cannot help will ing thus or thus. If so, they are no more blamable for that will, than for the actions which follow it. There is no blame if they are under a necessity of willing. There can be no moral good or evil, unless they have liberty as well as will, which is entirely a different thing. And the not adverting to this seems to be the direct occasion of Mr. Edwards's whole mistake. 8. God created man an intelligent being; and endued him with will as well as understanding. Indeed, it seems, without this, his understanding would have been given to no purpose. Neither would either his will or understanding have answered any valuable purpose, if liberty had not been added to them, a power distinct from both; a power of choosing for himself, a self-determining principle. It may be doubted whether God ever made an intelligent creature without all these three faculties; whether any spirit ever existed without them; yea, whether they are not implied in the very nature of a spirit.