Wesley Corpus

He flatly and roundly affirms, The Creator is the proper Author of everything which man does; that by creating him thus, he has absolutely determined the manner wherein he shall act; and that there fore man can no more help sinning, than a stone can help falling. The Assembly of Divines do as directly ascribe the necessity of human actions to God, in affirming that God has eternally determined whatsoever shall be done in time. So likewise does Mr. Edwards of New-England; in proving by abundance of deep, metaphysical reasoning, that “we must see, hear, taste, feel the objects that surround us, and must have such judgments, passions, actions, and no other.” He flatly ascribes the necessity of all our actions to Him who united our souls to these bodies, placed us in the midst of these objects, and ordered that these sensations, judgments, passions, and actions should spring therefrom. 5. The author last cited connects together and confirms all the preceding schemes; particularly those of the ancient Stoics and the modern Calvinists. III. 1. It is not easy for a man of common understanding, especially if unassisted by education, to unravel these finely woven schemes, or show distinctly where the fallacy lies. But he knows, he feels, he is certain, they cannot be true; that the holy God cannot be the author of sin. The horrid consequences of supposing this may appear to the meanest understanding, from a few plain, obvious considerations, of which every man that has common sense may judge. If all the passions, the tempers, the actions of men, are wholly independent on their own choice, are governed by a principle exterior to themselves, then there can be no moral good or evil; there can be neither virtue nor vice, neither good nor bad actions, neither good nor bad passions or tempers. The sun does much good; but it is no virtue; but he is not capable of moral goodness. Why is he not? For this plain reason, because he does not act from choice. The sea does much harm: It swallows up thousands of men; but it is not capable of moral badness, because it does not act by choice, but from a necessity of mature. If indeed one or the other can be said to act at all.