Treatise Thoughts Upon Necessity
| Author | John Wesley |
|---|---|
| Type | treatise |
| Year | None |
| Passage ID | jw-treatise-thoughts-upon-necessity-002 |
| Words | 395 |
And
do you never speak or act in such a manner as your own
reason condemns?” He candidly answered, “Indeed I do. I frequently feel tempers, and speak many words, and do
many actions, which I do not approve of. But I cannot
avoid it. They result, whether I will or no, from the
vibrations of my brain, together with the motion of my blood,
and the flow of my animal spirits. But these are not in my
own power. I cannot help them. They are independent on
my choice. And therefore I cannot apprehend myself to be
a sinner on this account.”
6. Very lately another gentleman, in free conversation, was
carrying this matter a little farther. Being asked, “Do you
believe God is almighty?” he answered, “I do; or he could
not have made the world.” “Do you believe he is wise?” “I
cannot tell." Much may be said on both sides.” “Do you
believe he is good?” “No; I cannot believe it. I believe
just the contrary. For all the evil in the world is owing to
Him. I can ascribe it to no other cause. I cannot blame that
cur for barking orbiting; it is his nature; and he did not make
himself. I feel wrong tempers in myself; but that is not my
fault; for I cannot help it. It is my nature; and I could
not prevent my having this nature, neither can I change it.”
7. The Assembly of Divines, who met at Westminster in
the last century, express very nearly the same sentiment,
though placed in a different light. They speak to this effect:
“Whatever happens in time, was unchangeably determined
from all eternity. God ordained or ever the world was made,
all the things that should come to pass therein. The greatest
and the smallest events were equally predetermined; in
particular, all the thoughts, all the words, all the actions of
every child of man; all that every man thinks, or speaks, or
does, from his birth, till his spirit returns to God that gave it. It follows, that no man can do either more or less good, or
more or less evil, than he does. None can think, speak, or
act any otherwise than he does, not in any the smallest
circumstance. In all he is bound by an invisible, but more
than adamantine, chain.