Wesley Corpus

Treatise Doctrine Of Original Sin

AuthorJohn Wesley
Typetreatise
YearNone
Passage IDjw-treatise-doctrine-of-original-sin-184
Words397
Reign of God Trinity Free Will
And this is true holiness of heart. You answer, (in many words,) “The new-created man did not love God supremely. For, before he could love God, the powers of his mind must have been quite finished, and actually exercised.” (Page 186.) And, doubtless, the very moment he was created, they were quite finished, and actually exercised too. For man was not gradually formed by God, as a statue is by a human artificer; but “He spake the word, and they were made; He commanded, and they were created.” And as light and heat were not subsequent to the creation of the sun, but began to exist with it, so that the moment it existed it shone; so spiritual light and heat, knowledge and love, were not sub sequent to the creation of man, but they began to exist toge ther with him. The moment he existed, he knew and loved. 2. If the new-made creature had not a propensity to love and obey God, but was in a state of mere indifference to good or evil, then his being put into such an union with flesh and blood, among a thousand temptations, would have been an over-balance on the side of vice. But our reason can never suppose, that God, the wise, just, and good, would have placed a new-made creature in such a situation. This argument cannot be answered, unless it can be showed, either, (1.) That in such a situation, there would not have been an over-balance on the side of vice; or, (2.) That to place a new-made creature in a situation where there was such an over-balance, was consistent with the wisdom, justice, and goodness of God. But, instead of showing, or even attempting to show, this, you feebly say, “I do not think the reason of man by any means sufficient to direct God, in what state to make moral agents.” (O that you had always thought so ! How much vain, yea, mischievous, reasoning had then been spared!) “But, however Adam’s propensities and temptations were balanced, he had freedom to choose evil as well as good.” (Pages 187, 188.) He had. But this is no answer to the argument, which, like the former, remains in its full force. How could a wise, just, and good God place his creature in such a state as that the scale of evil should preponderate?