Wesley Corpus

Treatise A Thought On Necessity

AuthorJohn Wesley
Typetreatise
YearNone
Passage IDjw-treatise-a-thought-on-necessity-003
Words390
Free Will Catholic Spirit Universal Redemption
Poor, impotent reason It can do neither more nor less in any of these matters. It cannot alter the outward constitu tion of things; the nature of light, sound, or the other objects that surround us. It cannot prevent their affecting our senses thus and thus. And then, will not all the rest follow 7 5. Make a trial, if reason can do any more, upon Lord Kames’s supposition. Can it in any degree alter the nature of the universal machine? Can it change or stop the motion of any one wheel? Utterly impossible. 6. Has free-will any more power in these respects than reason? Let the trial be made upon each of these schemes. What can it do upon Dr. Hartley’s scheme? Can our free-will alter one vibration of the brain? What can it do upon the second scheme? Can it erase or alter one of the traces formed there? What can it do upon Mr. Edwards's? Can it alter the appearances of the things that surround us? or the impressions they make upon the nerves? or the natural consequences of them? Can it do anything more on Lord Kames’s scheme? Can it anyways alter the constitu tion of the great clock 2 Stand still ! Look awhile into your own breast ! What can your will do in any of these matters? Ah, poor free-will! Does not plain experience show, it is as impotent as your reason? Let it stand then as an eternal truth, “Without me ye can do nothing.” VI. 1. But in the same old book there is another word: “I can do all things through Christ strengthening me.” Here the charm is dissolved ! The light breaks in, and the shadows flee away. One of these sentences should never be viewed apart from the other: Each receives light from the other. God hath joined them together, and let no man put them asunder. Now, taking this into the account, I care not one pin for all Dr. Hartley can say of his vibrations. Allowing the whole which he contends for, allowing all the links of his mathematical chain to be as indissolubly joined together as are the propositions in Euclid; suppose vibrations, per ceptions, judgments, passions, tempers, actions, ever so naturally to follow each other: What is all this to the God of nature?