Wesley Corpus

Treatise A Thought On Necessity

AuthorJohn Wesley
Typetreatise
YearNone
Passage IDjw-treatise-a-thought-on-necessity-002
Words392
Free Will Reign of God Catholic Spirit
With infinite pains, with immense parade, with the utmost ostentation of mathematical and metaphysical learning, they have discovered just as much as they might have found in one single line of the Bible. “Without me ye can do nothing !” absolutely, positively nothing ! seeing, in Him all things live and move, as well as have their being; seeing, he is not only the true primum mobile, containing the whole frame of creation, but likewise the inward, sustaining, acting principle, indeed the only proper agent in the universe; unless so far as he imparts a spark of his active, self-moving nature to created spirits. But more especially “ye can do nothing” right, nothing wise, nothing good, without the direct, immediate agency of the First Cause. 2. Let the trial be made. And First, what can reason, all-sufficient reason, do in this matter? Let us try, upon Dr. Hartley’s scheme. Can it prevent or alter the vibrations of the brain? Can it prevent or alter the various compo sitions of them ? or cut off the cqnnexion between these, and our apprehensions, judgments, reasonings? or between these and our passions? or that between our passions, and our words and actions? Not at all. Reason can do nothing in this matter. In spite of all our reason, nature will keep its course, will hold on its way, and utterly bear down its feeble opponent. 3. And what can reason do, upon the second supposition? Can it prevent or alter the traces in the brain? Not a jot more than it could the vibrations. They laugh at all its power. Can it cut off the connexion between those traces and our apprehensions; or that between our apprehensions and our passions; or between our passions and actions? No thing at all of this. It may see the evil, but it cannot help it. 4. Try what reason can do, upon the third supposition, that of President Edwards. Can it change the appearances of the things that surround us? or the impression which the nerves convey to the common sensory? or the sensation that follows? or the apprehension? Or can it cut off the con nexion between our apprehensions of things and our passions? or that between our passions and our actions? Poor, impotent reason It can do neither more nor less in any of these matters.