Treatise A Thought On Necessity
| Author | John Wesley |
|---|---|
| Type | treatise |
| Year | None |
| Passage ID | jw-treatise-a-thought-on-necessity-002 |
| Words | 392 |
With infinite
pains, with immense parade, with the utmost ostentation of
mathematical and metaphysical learning, they have discovered
just as much as they might have found in one single line of
the Bible. “Without me ye can do nothing !” absolutely, positively
nothing ! seeing, in Him all things live and move, as well as
have their being; seeing, he is not only the true primum
mobile, containing the whole frame of creation, but likewise the
inward, sustaining, acting principle, indeed the only proper
agent in the universe; unless so far as he imparts a spark of
his active, self-moving nature to created spirits. But more
especially “ye can do nothing” right, nothing wise, nothing
good, without the direct, immediate agency of the First
Cause. 2. Let the trial be made. And First, what can reason,
all-sufficient reason, do in this matter? Let us try, upon
Dr. Hartley’s scheme. Can it prevent or alter the vibrations
of the brain? Can it prevent or alter the various compo
sitions of them ? or cut off the cqnnexion between these, and
our apprehensions, judgments, reasonings? or between these
and our passions? or that between our passions, and our
words and actions? Not at all. Reason can do nothing in
this matter. In spite of all our reason, nature will keep its
course, will hold on its way, and utterly bear down its feeble
opponent. 3. And what can reason do, upon the second supposition? Can it prevent or alter the traces in the brain? Not a jot
more than it could the vibrations. They laugh at all its
power. Can it cut off the connexion between those traces
and our apprehensions; or that between our apprehensions
and our passions; or between our passions and actions? No
thing at all of this. It may see the evil, but it cannot help it. 4. Try what reason can do, upon the third supposition,
that of President Edwards. Can it change the appearances
of the things that surround us? or the impression which the
nerves convey to the common sensory? or the sensation that
follows? or the apprehension? Or can it cut off the con
nexion between our apprehensions of things and our
passions? or that between our passions and our actions? Poor, impotent reason It can do neither more nor less in
any of these matters.