Wesley Corpus

DEAR MOTHER,--I must beg leave to assure you that before I received yours I was fully convinced of two things,-first, that Mr. Berkeley's [George Berkeley, D.D. (1685-1753), Bishop of Cloyne 1734. He published his Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous in 1713. The reference is to the early part of the Second Dialogue.] notion, which at first sight appeared very plausible--as, indeed, an ingenious disputant will make almost anything appear--was utterly groundless; and that he either advanced a palpable falsehood, or said nothing at all: and, secondly, that I had been under a mistake in adhering to that definition of Faith which Dr. Fiddes [Richard Fiddes (1671--July 8, 1725). A critical account of him is given by Hearne in his diary for July 15 of this year. He was author of A Body of Divinity (2 vols. folio, 1718-20) and other works. He and his school defined faith as 'an assent to a proposition on reasonable (or rational) grounds.'] sets down as the only true one. Mr. Berkeley's reasons on a second reading I found to be mere fallacy, though very artfully disguised. From one or two you may easily judge of what kind his other arguments are. He introduces Hylas charging Philonous with skepticism for denying the existence of sensible things: to which Philonous replies that, if denying the existence of sensible things constitute a skeptic, he will prove those to be such who assert sensible things to be material; for if all sensible things are material, then, if it be proved that nothing material exists, it will follow that no sensible thing exists; and that nothing material can exist he undertakes to demonstrate. Matter, says he (by which you must mean something sensible, or rise how came you to know of it), you define a solid extended substance, the existence of which is exterior to the mind and does in no ways depend on its being perceived; but if it appear that no sensible thing is exterior to the mind, your supposition of a sensible substance independent on it is a plain inconsistency.