To his Mother Date: OXON, July 29, 1725 DEAR MOTHER, I must in the first place beg you to excuse my writing so small, since I shall not otherwise have time to make an end before the post goes out; as I am not sure I shall, whether I make haste or no. The King of Poland has promised what satisfaction shall be thought requisite in the affair of Thorn In 1724 a riot occurred at Thorn in Poland between Jesuit students and Protestants who were accused of sacrilege. The aged President of the City Council and several leading citizens were executed in December. The Protestant Powers of Europe were indignant, and the Poles especially annoyed by the speech of the English minister at Ratisbon. See Morfill's Poland, p. 2o3; and letter of Nov.; so that all Europe seemed now disposed for peace as well as England, though the Spaniards daily plunder our merchantmen as fast as they can catch them in the West Indies. Spain was hoping to regain her lost possessions across the Atlantic, and sought to monopolize the commerce of the most important part of the New World, and the rigid exercise of the right of search on the high seas gave rise to many acts of violence and barbarity (Lecky's England. in the Eighteenth Century, i. 449). In 1727 she besieged Gibraltar. You have much obliged me by your thoughts on Dr. Taylor, See letter of Feb. 28, 1730. especially with respect to humility, which is a point he does not seem to me sufficiently to dear. As to absolute humility (if I may venture to make a distinction, which I don't remember to have seen in any author), consisting in a mean opinion of ourselves, considered simply, or with respect to God alone, I can readily join with his opinion. But I am more uncertain as to comparative, if I may so term it; and think some, plausible reasons may be alleged to show it is not in our power, and consequently not a virtue, to think ourselves the worst in every company.

We have so invincible an attachment to truth already perceived, that it is impossible for us to disbelieve it. A distinct perception commands our assent, and the will is under a moral necessity of yielding to it. It is not, therefore, in every case a matter of choice whether we will believe ourselves worse than our neighbor or no; since we may distinctly perceive the truth of this proposition, He is worse than me; and then the judgment is not free. One, for instance, who is in company with a free-thinker, or other person signally debauched in faith and practice, can't avoid knowing himself to be the better of the two; these' propositions extorting our assent, An Atheist is worse than a Believer; A man who endeavors to please God is better than he who defies Him. If a true knowledge of God be necessary to absolute humility, a true knowledge of our neighbor should be necessary to comparative. But to judge oneself the worst of all men implies a want of such knowledge. No knowledge can be, where there is not certain evidence; which we have not, whether we compare ourselves with acquaintance or strangers. In the one case we have only imperfect evidence, unless we can see through the heart and reins; in the other we have none at all. So that the best can be said of us in this particular, allowing the truth of the premises, is that we have been in a pious error, if at least we may yield so great a point to free-thinkers as to own any part of piety to be grounded on a mistake. Again, this kind of humility can never be well-pleasing to God, since it does not flow from faith, without which it impossible to please Him. Faith is a species of belief, and belief is defined 'an assent to a proposition upon rational grounds.' Without rational grounds there is therefore no belief, and consequently no faith.

That we can never be so certain of the pardon of our sins as to be assured they will never rise up against us, I firmly believe. We know that they will infallibly do so if ever we apostatize, and I am not satisfied what evidence there can be, of our final perseverance till we have finished our course. But I am persuaded we may know if we are now in a state of salvation, since that is expressly promised in the Holy Scriptures to our sincere endeavors, and we are surely able to judge of our own sincerity. As I understand faith to be an assent to any truth upon rational grounds, I don't think it possible without perjury to swear I believe anything, unless I have rational grounds for my persuasion. Now, that which contradicts reason can't be said to stand on rational grounds; and such undoubtedly is every proposition which is incompatible with the Divine Justice or Mercy. I can therefore never say I believe such a proposition, since 'tis impossible to assent upon reasonable evidence where it is not in being. What, then, shall I say of Predestination An everlasting purpose of God to deliver some from damnation does, I suppose, exclude all from that deliverance who are not chosen. And if it was inevitably decreed from eternity that such a determinate part of mankind should be saved, and none beside them, a vast majority of the world were only born to eternal death, without so much as a possibility of avoiding it. How is this consistent with either the Divine Justice or Mercy Is it merciful to ordain a creature to everlasting misery Is it just to punish man for crimes which he could not but commit How is man, if necessarily determined to one way of acting, a free agent To lie under either a physical or a moral necessity is entirely repugnant to human liberty. But that God should be the author of sin and injustice (which must, I think, be the consequence of maintaining this opinion) is a contradiction to the clearest ideas we have of the divine nature and perfections.

I call faith an assent upon rational grounds, because I hold divine testimony to be the most reasonable of all evidence whatever. Faith must necessarily at length be resolved into reason. God is true; therefore what He says is true. He hath said this; therefore this is true. When any one can bring me more reasonable propositions than these, I am ready to assent to them: till then, it will be highly unreasonable to change my opinion. I used to think that the difficulty of Predestination might be solved by supposing that it was indeed decreed from eternity that a remnant should be elected, but that it was in every man's power to be of that remnant. But the words of our Article will not bear that sense. I see no other way but to allow that some may be saved who were not always of the number of the elected. Your sentiments on this point, especially where I am in an error, will much oblige and I hope improve Your dutiful Son.